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ON THE EDGE: THE ADA’S DIRECT THREAT 
DEFENSE AND THE OBJECTIVE 
REASONABLENESS STANDARD 
JAROD S. GONZALEZ* 
One of the most important issues under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) is the appropriate standard for evaluating Title I employment disability 
discrimination cases where the employer argues that the employee has a 
medical condition that poses too much of a safety risk for the employee to work 
in a particular position.  This is called the “direct threat” concept.  In general, 
this permits an employer to discriminate against an employee on the basis of 
disability if the employee poses a “significant risk of substantial harm to the 
health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced 
by reasonable accommodation.”  The federal courts of appeals are split on 
whether direct threat under Title I of the ADA is an affirmative defense that the 
employer must prove, or, alternatively, whether a qualified employee with a 
disability must prove that he or she can safely perform all essential job 
functions and is not a direct threat.   
This Article advocates for the treatment of the direct threat concept as an 
affirmative defense that the employer must prove.  This Article further explains 
that proof of this defense does not require the employer to prove that its direct 
threat determination is “correct.”  Instead, the law requires the employer to 
prove that its direct threat determination was “objectively reasonable.”  
Objective reasonableness often depends on the procedures that the employer 
uses to come to this conclusion.  This Article also explains how the employer 
should take certain steps to better demonstrate that its direct threat 
determination was objectively reasonable.  Finally, this Article explains how to 
apply the objective reasonableness standard when the employer is faced with 
conflicting medical opinions from qualified medical providers about whether 
an employee poses a direct threat in the workplace.  The insights from the 
Article are applied to the summary judgment procedure and jury instructions 
 
* Copyright © 2019, Jarod S. Gonzalez, J. Hadley Edgar Professor of Law, Texas Tech 
University School of Law; B.B.A., summa cum laude, University of Oklahoma, 1997; J.D., with 
highest honors, University of Oklahoma College of Law, 2000. 
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in direct threat cases.  In particular, it is hoped that this Article will help to 
reshape jury charges in direct threat cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employment discrimination laws generally make it illegal for employers to 
take adverse employment actions against employees on the basis of certain 
protected characteristics that have no bearing on an employee’s ability to 
perform a job.  But sometimes employers may lawfully act on the basis of an 
employee’s protected characteristics.  This type of lawful “discrimination”—
where the employer is admittedly acting on the basis of the employee’s 
protected characteristic—finds support in employment discrimination 
doctrines, such as the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; the BFOQ defense 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended; the 
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religious employer exemption to religious discrimination under Title VII; and 
the ministerial exception to employment discrimination statutes.1 
In addition, a similar type of “lawful” discrimination can sometimes exist 
in the disability discrimination law context under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).  For example, an employer might take a personnel 
action against a disabled employee because the employee’s impairment 
prevents them from performing the job and no reasonable accommodation is 
available to assist the employee to perform the essential job functions.2  A 
unifying justification for these doctrines that permit lawful discrimination is the 
idea that in limited circumstances an employee’s protected characteristic may 
actually impact the employee’s ability to perform the job or for the employer to 
effectively and efficiently operate its business.3  Safety-based concerns are one 
of the most common suggested justifications for permitting discrimination on 
the basis of a protected characteristic—once again, in limited circumstances.4 
The ADA’s direct threat defense is an important example of a space that 
the law creates for lawful employment discrimination justified by safety-based 
concerns.5  The ADA’s direct threat doctrine traces its roots to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1987 decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,6 which 
interpreted the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,7 a predecessor of the ADA.8  In 
 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2012) (Title VII BFOQ defense); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2012) 
(ADEA BFOQ defense); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (exempting religious entities from Title VII’s 
prohibition against religious discrimination); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (recognizing ministerial exception to federal anti-discrimination 
statutes). 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified 
individual on the basis of disability in regard to [employment decisions].”).  A “qualified individual” 
is “an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions 
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  42 U.S.C.  § 12111(8) (2012).   
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (Title VII BFOQ defense) (emphasis added) (“[I]t shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his 
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.”). 
4. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412–17 (1985) (explaining the test for 
evaluating a BFOQ defense to an age-based qualification based on considerations of safety). 
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2012). 
6. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–796 (2012). 
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012). 
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Arline, a school teacher alleged disability discrimination against her employer 
after she was discharged from employment because of her contagious disease 
that allegedly posed a threat to others in the workplace.9  The Arline Court 
provided the contours of the direct threat defense: an individualized inquiry of 
the safety risks posed by the employee and factual safety determinations based 
on reasonable medical judgments given the state of knowledge of the nature, 
duration, and severity of the risks to the health or safety of others.10 
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA.11  Title I of the ADA, which addresses 
disability discrimination in employment, incorporated the direct threat 
concept.12  The basic principle is that an employer may require that an employee 
not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of that employee or to others in 
the workplace.13  The direct threat doctrine tries to strike a balance between 
competing concerns.  On the one hand, allowing an unsafe employee to 
continue to work in the job could lead to tort liability and other problems the 
employer legitimately wants to avoid.14  On the other hand, taking an adverse 
employment action against an employee, where safety concerns are unfounded, 
may improperly screen out individuals with disabilities.15  And the law rightly 
prohibits employers from acting against an employee—because of the 
employee’s medical condition—on the basis of stereotype and myth and 
without objective evidence of a significant safety issue.16  While the 
 
9. Arline, 480 U.S. at 276–77. 
10. Id. at 287–89; id. at 287 n.16 (“A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an 
infectious disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if 
reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that risk.”). 
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b). 
13. Although the statutory language does not expressly state a direct threat-to-self defense, the 
Equal Opportunity Commission regulation on the direct threat defense authorizes a threat-to-self 
defense, and the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that part of the regulation in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 77, 87 (2002) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (2001)). 
14. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 84 (suggesting—moral concerns aside—that avoidance of lost work 
time “to sickness, excessive turnover from medical retirement or death, litigation under state tort law, 
and the risk of violating the national Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, . . . 29 U.S.C. § 651 
et seq.” are all reasons for the defense). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(6) (using standards, tests, and criteria that screen out individuals 
with disabilities may constitute disability discrimination). 
16. In discussing the direct threat defense, the ADA’s legislative history provides:  
“A person with a disability must not be excluded, or found to be unqualified, 
based on stereotypes or fear.  Nor may a decision be based on speculation about 
the risk or harm to others.  Decisions are not permitted to be based on 
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fundamentals of direct threat law are solid, case law development reveals a 
number of unanswered questions concerning the operation of the defense, 
which this Article elucidates. 
Most importantly, there is a lack of clarity in the law concerning the steps 
employers must take and evidence employers must possess to justify legally 
acting on the basis of an employee’s direct threat to the health and safety of that 
employee or to others in the workplace.  In general, it is seemingly the law that 
an employer’s determination that an employee poses a direct threat for safety 
reasons is legal if it is objectively reasonable, which is based on objective 
medical evidence and reasonable medical judgments. 
Cases arising on the edge of objective reasonableness present employers 
with difficult ADA compliance challenges.  Employers must navigate this edge 
but doing so requires additional clarity in the law concerning how judges (and 
juries) are to evaluate the objective reasonableness of an employer’s direct 
threat determination.  Therefore, this Article has three goals: (1) to confirm the 
objective reasonableness standard for the direct threat defense; (2) to 
demonstrate how some courts have either improperly failed to use this standard 
or applied it incorrectly; and (3) to outline suggested changes to the law in this 
area that will provide greater clarity to employers and employees regarding how 
courts (and juries) are to evaluate whether an employer’s determination of 
direct threat is objectively reasonable.  To accomplish these three goals, Part II 
of this Article examines the history and purpose of the direct threat doctrine.  
Part III explains the complicated burden of proof issue regarding direct threat 
and the interaction between safety-based qualification standards and direct 
threat.  Part IV explains the suggested changes to the objective reasonableness 
standard. 
In general, an employer proves “objective reasonableness” when it 
demonstrates that it (1) conducted an individualized assessment of the 
employee’s ability to safely perform the job; (2) exhausted all legal 
requirements to find a reasonable accommodation for the employee who poses 
the safety concern; and (3) took action against the employee on the basis of a 
thorough report from a qualified medical provider opining that the employee is 
not qualified for continued employment in the position in question due to the 
safety issues.  The report should be based on the medical provider’s 
examination of the employee, the provider’s review of the employee’s relevant 
 
generalizations about the disability but rather must be based on the facts of an 
individual case.”   
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 468. 
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medical records, or both.  In addition, the provider’s explanatory reasons for 
their safety determination needs to be based on a reasonable medical judgment 
that is tied to safe performance of the essential functions of the position.  
Finally, the employer should demonstrate that the medical provider was 
properly educated on the essential functions of the position and the actual nature 
of the working environment as part of the provider’s individualized assessment 
of the employee’s ability to safely perform the job. 
II. HISTORY OF THE ADA’S TITLE I DIRECT THREAT DEFENSE 
42 U.S.C. § 12113 states the ADA’s Title I direct threat defense.  It is titled 
“Defenses”: 
(a) In general.  It may be a defense to a charge of 
discrimination under this [Act] that an alleged application 
of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that 
screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or 
benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to 
be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and 
such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable 
accommodation, as required under this subchapter. 
(b) Qualification standards.  The term “qualification 
standards” may include a requirement that an individual 
shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other 
individuals in the workplace.17 
The definitional section of Subchapter I defines “direct threat” to mean “a 
significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by 
reasonable accommodation.”18 
The Act’s legislative history indicates that the drafters of the direct threat 
standard intended to codify the basic analysis in Arline.19  When the ADA was 
signed into law on July 26, 1990, Section 12205a of the Act required that the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) promulgate substantive 
regulations implementing Title I of the Act within one year of the date of 
 
17. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101–12213 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a)–
(b).  
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3) (2012). 
19. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 45 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 468 (“In 
order to determine whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals 
in the workplace, the [House Judiciary] Committee intends to use the same standard as articulated by 
the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline.”). 
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enactment.20  The EEOC did so, and the regulations include further explanation 
of the direct threat defense.21  The regulations state: 
Direct threat as a qualification standard.  The term 
“qualification standard” may include a requirement that an 
individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety 
of the individual or others in the workplace.22 
The regulations qualify the direct threat standard: 
Direct Threat means a significant risk of substantial harm to 
the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be 
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation.  The 
determination that an individual poses a “direct threat” shall be 
based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s 
present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the 
job.  This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical 
judgment that relies on the most current medical knowledge 
and/or on the best available objective evidence.  In determining 
whether an individual would pose a direct threat, the factors to 
be considered include: (1) [t]he duration of the risk; (2) [t]he 
nature and severity of the potential harm; (3) [t]he likelihood 
that the potential harm will occur; and (4) [t]he imminence of 
the potential harm.23 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the ADA’s direct threat concept on 
several occasions.  In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court issued an opinion 
in an ADA case where a dentist refused to perform a dental procedure on a 
patient infected with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).24  The patient-
plaintiff sued the dentist under Title II of the ADA’s public accommodations 
 
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2012).  
21. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (1996); id. §§ 1630.15(b)(2), 1630.2(r).  Although the Americans 
with Disabilities Act was amended in 2009—the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act 
(ADAAA) and new regulations on that Act went into effect in 2011—none of the updated regulations 
changed the direct threat defense regulations.  Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment 
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,978, 17,003 (Mar. 25, 
2011) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R pt. 1630). 
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (emphasis omitted). 
23. Id. § 1630.2(r). 
24. 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998).  
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provisions.25  The dentist defended on the ground that performing the dental 
procedure on the patient would have posed a direct threat to the health or safety 
of others due to the patient’s HIV-positive status and the risk of infection.26  
The ADA’s public accommodations law has a direct threat defense similar to 
the one in Title I of the Act.27  The Court held that under this direct threat 
defense the evaluation of whether a significant risk existed must be determined 
from the standpoint of the medical provider (here the dentist), the person who 
refused to provide the treatment or an accommodation.28  In addition, the 
medical provider’s risk assessment must be based on the objective scientific, 
medical, or other evidence available to health care professionals in the field.29  
In adopting this “objective reasonableness” standard, the Court rejected a 
subjective good faith standard.  In other words, a medical provider’s subjective 
belief that a significant risk existed, even if maintained in good faith, would not 
relieve them from liability if the belief was not objectively reasonable in light 
of the available medical evidence.30 
In Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, a Title I of the ADA disability 
discrimination in employment case, a grocery store chain fired and then refused 
to rehire a commercial truck driver with monocular vision.31  The employer 
based its decision to fire the employee on the employee’s inability to meet a 
Federal Department of Transportation (DOT) safety standard on visual acuity.32  
The employer refused to rehire the employer even after the employee secured 
a DOT waiver from the federal vision requirement.33  The Court framed the 
question in the case as “whether . . . an employer who requires as a job 
 
25. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who . . . operates a place of 
public accommodation.”).  The term “public accommodation” includes the “professional office of a 
health care provider.”  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). 
26. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 630. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to permit an 
individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and 
accommodations of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of 
others.”). 
28. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 649. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 649–50. 
31. 527 U.S. 555, 558–60 (1999). 
32. Id. at 560. 
33. Id. 
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qualification that an employee meet an otherwise applicable federal safety 
regulation must justify enforcing the regulation solely because [the] standard 
may be waived in an individual case.”34  In siding with the employer, the Court 
answered the question in the negative.35  The Court rejected an argument by the 
employee and the government that the employer had to satisfy the direct threat 
defense in this particular case.36  The employer was permitted to rely on federal 
regulations establishing the basic visual acuity standard, and the waiver 
program in and of itself was not sufficient to require an employer to depart from 
the basic standard.37 
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, another Title I disability 
discrimination in employment case, an oil company refused to hire an applicant 
for a position in its refinery because a medical examination revealed that the 
applicant’s liver condition would be exacerbated by exposure to toxins at the 
refinery.38  The employer justified its decision on the ground that the employee 
was a direct threat to himself.39  Although the Title I statutory direct threat 
defense language does not include threat-to-self, the EEOC regulation on point 
recognized a threat-to-self defense.40  The Court upheld the EEOC’s threat-to-
self addition as it was a reasonable interpretation of the statute and entitled to 
deference based on the expansive statutory language regarding safety-based 
qualification standards and direct threat.41 
III. BURDEN OF PROOF AND SAFETY-BASED QUALIFICATION STANDARDS  
A. Burden of Proof and Direct Threat   
This Article has referred to the direct threat concept as a defense.  But that 
is not necessarily the correct terminology.  The federal courts of appeals are 
split on whether direct threat is an affirmative defense that the employer must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence, or, alternatively, that proving the 
lack of a direct threat is the employee’s obligation—at least if safety is a specific 
 
34. Id. at 558. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 569–71. 
37. Id. at 568–78. 
38. 536 U.S. 73, 76 (2002). 
39. Id. at 77. 
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (1996). 
41. Echazabal, 536 U.S. at 78–87. 
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part of the essential job function in question.42  The problem arises from 
ambiguous statutory language.  Recall that the direct threat statutory language 
is in a section labeled “Defenses.”43  The “Defenses” title suggests direct threat 
is the employer’s affirmative defense.  Indeed, the § 12113(a) language uses 
the term “defense” and is connected to the direct threat language in § 12113(b).  
Overall, the § 12113 language appears to assign the burden to the employer to 
prove direct threat.44  But, if that is so, the § 12113 language essentially requires 
the employer to prove that the employee cannot perform an essential job 
function in a safe manner.  This appears to conflict with the ADA’s statutory 
provisions that assign the burden of proof to the employee to prove that they 
are a qualified individual who can perform all essential job functions with or 
 
42. Compare Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 905–06 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (describing direct threat as 
a defense), and Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (arguing it is the employer’s 
burden to show that an employee posed a direct threat to workplace safety that cannot be eliminated 
by a reasonable accommodation), and Hutton v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 273 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“Because it is an affirmative defense, the employer bears the burden of proving that an 
employee constitutes a direct threat.”), with Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1091 
(10th Cir. 2008) (“Though the burden of showing that an employee is a direct threat typically falls on 
the employer ‘where the essential job duties necessarily implicate the safety of others, then the burden 
may be on the plaintiff to show that [he] can perform those functions without endangering others.”), 
and EEOC v. Amego, Inc., 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is the plaintiff’s burden to show 
that he or she can perform the essential functions . . . and is therefore ‘qualified.’  Where those essential 
job functions necessarily implicate the safety of others, plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform 
those functions in a way that does not endanger others.”), and Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 
446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“The employee retains at all times the burden of persuading 
the jury . . . that he was not a direct threat . . . . ”). 
 Some federal circuit courts have not decided the question.  See Coleman v. Pa. State Police, 561 
F. App’x 138, 144 n.9 (3d Cir. 2014) (declining to decide whether it is the employer’s burden to prove 
direct threat or the employee’s burden to disprove direct threat); Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. 
App’x 1, 12 n.14 (6th Cir. 2012) (raising the issue but noting that Sixth Circuit has not decided the 
issue and declining to resolve the issue because it was unnecessary to resolve the case); Sista v. CDC 
Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 170 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although the parties disagree as to which 
party bears the burden of proving or disproving that an employee poses a direct threat . . . , we need 
not address this issue, given our resolution of this case.”); Rizzo v. Children’s World Learning Ctrs., 
Inc., 213 F.3d 209, 213 n.14 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (arguing it is “unclear from the statutory scheme who 
has the burden on this issue”). 
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (2012). 
44. Hutton, 273 F.3d at 892–93 (noting that the direct threat defense to a charge of discrimination 
is set forth in the “Defenses” section of the ADA and concluding that direct threat is an affirmative 
defense that the employer must prove). 
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without a reasonable accommodation.45  In fact, the statutory section that 
includes direct threat also classifies direct threat as a “qualification standard,” 
which lends further support to the idea that to be a “qualified individual with a 
disability,” the employee must prove that they can perform essential job 
functions without a direct threat.46 
B. Safety-based Qualification Standards, Business Necessity, 
and Direct Threat  
Another direct threat related issue concerns the treatment of safety-based 
qualification standards.  In a typical direct threat case, an employer is 
conducting an individualized analysis of the safety risk of a particular 
employee, often with the help of medical examinations of the employee, 
medical expert review of the employee’s medical records, and reports prepared 
by medical experts that evaluate the safety risks of the employee performing 
the position.47  Direct threat applies although there may be no applicable safety-
based qualification standard upon which the employer relies.48  In other 
circumstances, an employer may have in place an across-the-board safety-based 
qualification standard that applies to all applicants or employees and may use 
 
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012) (stating it is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against 
a qualified individual on the basis of disability”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2012) (defining “qualified 
individual”); U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 399–401 (2002) (stating the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proving she is a qualified individual who can perform the essential functions of the job 
with or without reasonable accommodation); Amego, 110 F.3d at 142–44 (stating the plaintiff bears 
the burden to show that she is a “qualified individual”).  See also Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 587 
F.3d 1255, 1261 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining that plaintiff must show “she is qualified to perform the 
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation”). 
46. Amego, 110 F.3d at 142–44 (arguing that the plaintiff has the burden to show that she is a 
“qualified individual” and that in doing so she must demonstrate that she is not a direct threat). 
47. Engle v. Physician Landing Zone, No. 14-1192, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35996, at *3, *17–
18 (W.D. Pa. March 24, 2017) (independent medical examination of employee who allegedly posed 
safety risk); Price v. WG Yates & Sons Constr. Co., No. 4:15cv419-MW/CAS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
219449, at *3 (N.D. Fla. March 27, 2017) (medical experts wrote detailed reports about safety risk of 
employee after reviewing employee’s medical records); Brooks v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. 1:09-cv-
00679-AJT-IDD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42739, at *7 (E.D. Va. April 30, 2010) (employer’s doctor 
reviewed employee’s medical records and conducted a strength test). 
48. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 2000) (“The direct threat test applies in 
cases in which an employer responds to an individual employee’s supposed risk that is not addressed 
by an existing qualification standard.”). 
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it as a basis for making personnel decisions.49  The question arises as to whether 
a “business necessity” analysis applies with respect to across-the-board safety-
based qualification standards or whether the employer must still independently 
prove a “direct threat” in this situation.50 
Section 12113(a) states that employers can defend a “qualification 
standard[]” on the basis that the standard is “job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.”51  Section 12113(b) states that the term “qualification 
standard” may include a direct threat defense, which could be viewed as 
establishing direct threat as a permissive factor to consider in safety cases.52  
The generalized § 12113(a) language and the more permissive § 12113(b) 
language indicate that a pre-existing safety-based qualification standard could 
be defended on “business necessity” grounds just like any other non-safety job 
requirements.53  But the EEOC takes the position in its Interpretive Guidance 
on the ADA that for a safety-based qualification standard to be “job-related and 
consistent and business necessity,” the employer must in every case still meet 
the “direct threat” standard articulated § 12113(b) and the EEOC’s Title I direct 
threat regulation.54  The U.S. Supreme Court has questioned whether this 
 
49. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 558–60 (1999) (employer applied federal 
visual acuity standard for its commercial truck drivers). 
50. Exxon, 203 F.3d at 873 (“Safety-based qualification standards are an accepted ground for a 
defense; the question before us is whether an employer may defend the questioned personnel decision 
as based on a standard justified as a business necessity or must demonstrate a ‘direct threat’ in each 
circumstance.”). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). 
52. Verzeni v. Potter, 109 F. App’x 485, 490–91 (3d Cir. 2004) (arguing that statutory language 
that includes direct threat as a permissive factor to consider does not require that it always be used 
when considering safety-related qualification standards). 
53. Exxon, 203 F.3d at 874 (“In cases where an employer has developed a general safety 
requirement for a position, safety is a qualification standard no different from other requirements 
defended under the ADA’s business necessity provision. . . .  Physical requirements, for example, such 
as lifting, walking or seeing, are acceptable defenses as long as the requirements are job-related and 
consistent with business necessity.”). 
54. Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 
app. § 1630.15(b) & (c) Disparate Impact Defenses (1996) (“With regard to safety requirements that 
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities, 
an employer must demonstrate that the requirement, as applied to the individual, satisfies the ‘direct 
threat’ standard in § 1630.2(r) in order to show that the requirement is job-related and consistent with 
business necessity.”). 
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interpretation of the statute is correct.55  A few federal courts have specifically 
rejected the EEOC’s position.56  Those courts have read the statutory language 
and the legislative history of the ADA to mean that employer safety-based 
qualification standards that apply to all employees of a particular class may be 
defended as a business necessity, and the direct threat test applies when an 
employer evaluates an employee’s safety risk that is not covered by a pre-
existing qualification standard.57 
If a “business necessity” analysis applies to an employer attempt to justify 
an across-the-board safety-related qualification standard, it is meaningful to 
discern the difference between that analysis and a direct threat analysis.  
Presumably, the litigation on this issue itself reveals there is some importance 
to distinguishing one from the other.  A “business necessity” standard could be 
viewed as setting a lower burden than the “direct threat” standard.58  The two 
standards could be viewed as requiring different proofs.59  At the very least, 
both standards require similar risk-based analyses that focus on weighing risks 
and harms, avoid stereotypes, and look to objective evidence.60  In Verzeni v. 
 
55. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 569–70 n.15 (1999) (questioning, but not 
deciding, whether the EEOC’s interpretation, which might impose a higher burden on employers to 
justify safety-based qualification standards than other job requirements, is correct). 
56. The EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance on this issue is not subjective to Chevron deference 
because it is not part of the direct threat regulation and only gets due deference to the extent “it is 
reasonable and harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin and purposes.”  Exxon, 203 
F.3d at 873; Verzeni, 109 F. App’x at 491; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
57. Exxon, 203 F.3d at 875 (stating that where safety-based qualifications standards apply to all 
employees of a given class, “an employer need not proceed under the direct threat provision 
of § 12113(b) in such cases but rather may defend the standard as a business necessity.  The direct 
threat test applies in cases in which an employer responds to an individual employee’s supposed risk 
that is not addressed by an existing qualification standard.”); Verzeni, 109 F. App’x at 491 (holding 
that “a defendant need not satisfy the direct threat defense every time that a safety qualification has an 
adverse impact on a disabled employee.  It may be sufficient for the employer simply to rely on the 
business necessity defense as laid out in the statute.”). 
58. Albertson’s, 527 U.S. at 569–70 n.15 (noting that direct threat analysis might impose a higher 
burden on employers than business necessity analysis). 
59. Bates v. UPS, 511 F.3d 974, 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although the specifics of proof in direct 
threat and business necessity [safety-based ADA] cases may vary, the frameworks are parallel.”); 
Exxon, 203 F.3d at 875 (“[D]irect threat and business necessity do not present hurdles that 
comparatively are inevitably higher or lower but rather require different types of proof.”). 
60. Bates, 511 F.3d at 993, 996 (noting that ADA’s business necessity defense analysis for 
safety-based qualifications standard is parallel to the ADA’s direct threat analysis and requires 
“evaluating whether the risks addressed by the qualification standard constitute a business necessity.”); 
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Potter, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals aptly articulated the business 
necessity defense of a safety-based qualification standard under the ADA, 
focusing on the risk-based factors from Arline, objective medical evidence, and 
avoidance of stereotypes and unfounded fears.61 
IV. DIRECT THREAT AND OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS 
A. Objective Reasonableness Is the Direct Threat Standard Under Title I of 
the ADA 
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the U.S. Supreme Court provided its most detailed 
analysis of the meaning of direct threat under the ADA.62  In Bragdon, the 
dentist refused to perform a dental procedure on a patient infected with the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).63  The patient-plaintiff sued the dentist 
under Title II of the ADA’s public accommodations provisions.64  The dentist 
defended on the ground that performing the dental procedure on the patient 
would have posed a direct threat to the health or safety of others due to the 
patient’s HIV-positive status and the risk of infection.65  The Court explained 
that in evaluating the dentist’s direct threat defense a court must look to the 
“objective reasonableness” of the dentist’s actions based on the most up-to-date 
medical evidence.66  No special deference was due to the dentist because he was 
 
Exxon, 203 F.3d at 875 (“In evaluating whether the risks addressed by a safety-based qualification 
standard constitute a business necessity, the court should take into account the magnitude of possible 
harm as well as the probability of occurrence.”). 
61. 109 F. App’x at 491–92 (citation omitted) (“Although the petitioners do not technically have 
to satisfy the direct threat defense, a factfinder must face the same concerns that the Supreme Court 
addressed in Arline about the nature of the risk, the duration of the risk, the severity of the risk, and the 
probabilities that the disability will cause harm.  For a safety qualification to meet the business 
necessity defense, it must be based on current medical knowledge about the disability and on the real 
risks that the disability may present.  Any jury considering this defense should be instructed not to base 
its determination on unfounded fears, but only on medically accurate facts.”). 
62. 524 U.S. 624, 629 (1998). 
63. Id. at 628–29. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2012) (“No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who . . . operates a place of 
public accommodation.”).  The term “public accommodation” includes the “professional office of a 
health care provider.”  42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2012). 
65. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 630. 
66. Id. at 649–50. 
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a health care professional.67  As the Bragdon Court’s opinion explained, 
“[C]ourts should assess the objective reasonableness of the views of health care 
professionals without deferring to their individual judgments,” and the risk 
assessment must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses 
the treatment or accommodation.68  Bragdon serves as a starting point for the 
direct threat analysis under Title I, and it makes sense to incorporate the 
objective reasonableness concept into Title I direct threat defense law.69 
1. Objective Reasonableness and Employer Determinations of Direct Threat 
Bragdon serves as a both a guide and a point of departure for understanding 
the operation of the Title I direct threat defense for employers.  Like the 
Bragdon risk assessment under Title II, the Title I direct threat risk assessment 
must be determined from the standpoint of the individual or entity who took the 
allegedly discriminatory action and must be evaluated on the basis of an 
objective medical judgment or other objective evidence.  In a Title II direct 
threat case, the employer is the entity that takes the adverse employment action, 
and the risk assessment should be viewed from the standpoint of the employer.  
The current EEOC regulation largely tracks these concepts of risk assessment.70 
In Bradgon, the direct threat decisionmaker also happened to be a doctor 
who had a duty to be up to date on objective medical evidence.  But that is 
unlike most Title I direct threat cases where the defendant-employer is not a 
doctor and typically not as well suited as a doctor to assess the safety risk.71  In 
Title I cases, the employer—the direct threat decisionmaker—and the medical 
evaluator are typically split.72  It is common for employers to seek out a health 
care professional to use their medical expertise to help determine whether an 
 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. See id. 
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996) (“The determination that an individual poses a ‘direct threat’ 
shall be based on an individualized assessment of the individual’s present ability to safely perform the 
essential functions of the job.  This assessment shall be based on a reasonable medical judgment that 
relies on the most current medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evidence.”). 
71. Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1123 (10th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing the Title II Bragdon 
case where the defendant was a health care professional from a case where an employer is making a 
direct threat determination under Title I and noting that a health care professional is generally “better 
trained to assess dangerousness than a typical employer”). 
72. See Nall v. BNSF Ry Co., 917 F.3d 335, 338–39 (5th Cir. 2019); Stragapede v. City of 
Evanston, 865 F.3d 861, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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employee poses a direct threat.73  Indeed, in many cases, it could be negligent 
on its face for an employer to fail to seek the guidance of a medical professional.  
Employers are not themselves necessarily medical experts.  It would seem to 
be an open question whether an employer should be given some level of 
deference when it makes a direct threat determination based on an expert 
medical provider’s conclusion that an employee cannot safely perform the job.  
Indeed, Arline reserved “the question whether courts should also defer to the 
reasonable medical judgments of private physicians on which an employer has 
relied.”74  Neither the Supreme Court’s Bragdon opinion, nor the Supreme 
Court’s Echazabal opinion, nor the EEOC regulation directly speak to the 
question.75 
 
 
 
73. See Nall, 917 F.3d at 338–40; Stragapede, 865 F.3d at 864–65; Anderson v. Consolidation 
Coal Co., 636 F. App’x 175, 178–79 (4th Cir. 2016); Coleman v. Pa. State Police, 561 Fed. App’x 138, 
140–42 (3d Cir. 2014); Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 2–8 (6th Cir. 2012); Interpretive 
Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App’x § 1630.2(r) 
Direct Threat (1996) (stating that in making a direct threat determination, the employer may consider 
relevant evidence such as “opinions of medical doctors, rehabilitation counselors, or physical therapists 
who have expertise in the disability involved and/or direct knowledge of the individual with the 
disability”); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISABILITY-
RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT (ADA), Question 12 (July 27, 2000), [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON 
DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES], 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html [https://perma.cc/2Q3A-94BC] (“To meet 
th[e direct threat] burden, an employer may want to have the employee examined by a health care 
professional of its choice who has expertise in the employee’s specific condition and can provide 
medical information that allows the employer to determine the effects of the condition on the 
employee’s ability to perform his/her job.”). 
74. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288 n.18 (1987). 
75. The Bragdon Court noted that the question about deference to the reasonable medical 
judgments of doctors on which employers rely merely “reserved the possibility that employers could 
consult with individual physicians as objective third-party experts.”   Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 
650 (1998).  Echazabal and the relevant EEOC regulation do make clear that a reasonable medical 
judgment needs to rely on “the most current medical knowledge and/or the best available objective 
evidence.”  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996).  
EEOC Enforcement Guidance states that an employer should be cautious about relying on its own 
doctor’s determination of direct threat if that opinion is contradicted by the opinion of the employee’s 
treating physician.  See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND 
MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 73. 
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2. Case Law Recognition of Objective Reasonableness as the Direct Threat 
Standard 
The public accommodations provisions of Title II are similar to the 
employment provisions of Title I and so, some federal courts are following 
Bragdon and conceptualizing the direct threat provision in Title I as stating an 
“objectively reasonable” standard.76  The employer complies with the ADA if 
its determination that an employee poses a direct threat to the health or safety 
of that individual or others in the workplace is “objectively reasonable.”77  And 
“objective reasonableness” may be satisfied when the employer’s direct threat 
determination is based on a reasonable medical judgment of a qualified doctor 
when that doctor has conducted an individualized assessment of the employee 
and has drawn a reasonable conclusion regarding the safety risks, even if 
another reasonable qualified doctor or a court would disagree.78  Courts, 
however, are not uniform in this conceptualization and—despite a solid EEOC 
regulation on point—it is not always clear whether an employer direct threat 
 
76. Nall, 917 F.3d at 342; Jarvis, 500 F.3d at 1122 (“We recognize that Bragdon was not an 
employment case. . . .  But the Court explicitly pointed out that the ADA contains parallel language in 
its employment provisions . . . and we see no reason not to apply Bragdon’s analysis to employment 
cases.”). 
77. Michael v. Troy Police Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2015). 
78. Id. at 309 (“Reasonable doctors of course can disagree . . . as to whether a particular 
employee can safely perform the functions of his job.  That is why the law requires only that the 
employer rely on an ‘objectively reasonable’ opinion, rather than an opinion that is correct.”); Class v. 
Towson Univ., 806 F.3d 236, 251 (4th Cir. 2015) (explaining that objective reasonableness standard in 
a Title II ADA case is not about whether the court shares the doctor’s medical judgment or whether 
another doctor has a better judgment but whether the doctor’s judgment in question is “reasonable—
i.e., whether it was individualized to [the plaintiff], was reasonably made, and was based on competent 
medical evidence”); Jarvis, 500 F.3d at 1122–23 (explaining that the fact finder’s role is to determine 
whether the employer’s direct threat determination is “objectively reasonable” and not to 
independently assess whether it believes that the employee posed a direct threat); Brooks v. Micron 
Tech., Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00679-AJT-IDD, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42739, at *17–18 (E.D. Va. April 
30, 2010) (arguing that the court does not independently assess whether the employee poses a direct 
threat, but instead evaluates whether the employer’s decision was objectively reasonable); see also 
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 31 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that “the mere obtaining 
of [a medical] opinion does not automatically absolve the employer from liability under the 
ADA. . . . [A]n employer cannot slavishly defer to a physician’s opinion without first pausing to assess 
the objective reasonableness of the physician’s conclusions.”). 
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determination is “objectively reasonable” if the employer acts on the basis of a 
medical expert’s judgment that is disputed by another medical expert.79 
B. Employer’s Procedural Steps in Analyzing Direct Threat Help to Prove 
Objective Reasonableness 
The procedural steps an employer takes to make a direct threat 
determination go a long way toward deciding whether the employer’s direct 
threat determination is objectively reasonable.  The direct threat concept 
requires both an individualized assessment of the employee’s ability to safely 
perform job functions and fully committed attempts to provide reasonable 
accommodation to the employee to reduce or eliminate the safety risk.80  If the 
employer does not satisfy its obligations on these points, any arguments the 
employer makes regarding objective reasonableness should fail.81  Beyond that, 
objective reasonableness often requires employers to consult with medical 
professionals to help the employer make a direct threat determination.  When 
an employer uses medical experts, what actions (or inactions) does the law 
require the employer to take to help demonstrate objective reasonableness?  
This is an open question. 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Nall v. BNSF Railway Co. is one of the best 
recent examples of the challenges of trying to determine how to evaluate the 
 
79. Nall, 917 F.3d at 338–40 (finding a genuine issue of material fact on whether the employer’s 
direct threat determination was objectively reasonable although employer’s medical doctors conducted 
an assessment of the employee and concluded that the employee could not safely perform job functions, 
while plaintiff’s doctors opined that the employee could safely perform job functions); Stragapede v. 
City of Evanston, 865 F.3d 861, 865–67 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding a genuine issue of material fact on 
whether employee posed a direct threat even though employer had a doctor’s opinion stating that the 
employee could not perform the essential functions of the job safely); Pollard v. Drummond Co., No. 
2:12-CV-03948-MHH, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120279, at *18–23 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2015) (medical 
experts disagreed on whether the employee posed a direct threat and so direct threat is a question for 
the jury); Nelson v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 2732 (JPO), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117742, at 
*33–42 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013) (finding a genuine issue of material fact on employer’s direct threat 
determination even after two medical doctors conducted an individualized assessment of the employee 
and concluded that the employee should not be rehired for safety reasons, while plaintiff’s personal 
therapist opined that the employee could safely perform the job). 
80. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). 
81. Monroe v. Cty. of Orange, No. 14-CV-1957 (KMK), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132408, at *2, 
*68–71 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2016) (finding issue of fact on direct threat for corrections officer with 
panic disorder because evidence could lead the fact finder to conclude that the employer did not 
conduct enough of an individualized assessment or attempt to find a reasonable accommodation for 
the employee). 
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objective reasonableness of an employer’s actions when the employer is 
utilizing medical experts to evaluate the potential direct threat of an employee.82  
In Nall, a railroad refused to allow an employee who suffered from Parkinson’s 
disease to return to his job as a trainman because of concerns related to his 
ability to safely perform job duties.83  The employer believed that the plaintiff’s 
physical abilities, related to balance and quick reaction times, precluded safe 
job performance.84  The plaintiff-employee sued for disability discrimination 
under the ADA, and the employer defended with the direct threat defense.85  In 
its initial opinion, the majority of the appellate court ruled that genuine issues 
of material fact existed for the jury to determine whether it was objectively 
reasonable for the employer to conclude that the employee posed a direct threat 
to others in the workplace.86  The summary judgment evidence indicated that 
(1) the employer’s doctors and plaintiff’s doctors disagreed as to whether the 
plaintiff could safely perform job duties; (2) the plaintiff had passed a field test 
administered by the employer; (3) the employer gave shifting job descriptions 
over time as to what the essential job duties were; and (4) certain comments 
made by BNSF employees could be viewed as evidence of discrimination 
against the employee because he had Parkinson’s disease.87  Most notably, the 
majority appeared to state that the employer was liable under the ADA because 
of procedural irregularities in its evaluation of the employee’s safety risk for 
the job.88  The allegation was that the employer was manipulating the evaluation 
process to try and achieve its desired result of disqualifying the employee from 
the job.89 
 
82. 917 F.3d at 335. 
83. Id. at 338–39. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 340. 
86. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 912 F.3d 263, 274–76 (5th Cir. 2018), withdrawn, 917 F.3d 335, 338 
(5th Cir. 2019). 
87. Id. at 268–73. 
88. Id. at 271–72. 
89. Id. (emphasis omitted) (“[T]he question on appeal is not whether it was reasonable for BNSF 
to conclude that Parkinson’s disease symptoms prevented Nall from safely performing his job duties; 
the question is whether BNSF came to that conclusion via a reasonable process that was not, as Nall 
alleges, manipulated midstream to achieve BNSF’s desired result of disqualifying him.  More 
precisely, the question is whether there is any evidence in the record which, if believed, would be 
sufficient to support a jury finding that BNSF’s procedures for evaluating Nall’s disability were 
unreasonable.”). 
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The dissenting opinion made clear that the question on the table was 
whether the employer’s direct threat determination was objectively 
reasonable.90  And, according to the dissent, there was no fact question as to 
whether the employer’s decision was objectively reasonable.91  After the 
employer learned about the employee’s Parkinson’s diagnosis, co-workers who 
observed the plaintiff-employee performing job duties unsafely in the field 
brought safety concerns of the employee to the employer.92  The employer then 
had independent doctors evaluate the employee, and the doctors verified the 
safety concerns.93  The employer then conducted a field test to see whether 
those safety concerns came to pass in the context of actual job duties.94  
Although the employee technically passed the test, the safety concerns were 
still exhibited.95  It was only after all this that the employer reasonably 
concluded that the employee posed too great a safety risk to work in the 
position.96  The dissent characterized the plaintiff’s evidence as nothing more 
than experts disagreeing with each other about “bottom-line conclusions” and 
“merely a good faith dispute between experts after an orderly process.”97  The 
dissent also disagreed with the majority’s assertion of a “process-based” theory 
under the ADA.98  The dissent argued that the “ADA does not impose liability 
based on perceived procedural irregularities” by itself.99  The question is 
whether the employer lacked a reasonable medical basis for concluding that the 
employee presented a direct threat to health of safety and not based on process 
problems alone.  Procedural irregularities would only matter if they made the 
employer’s medical conclusion unreasonable, which was not the case here.100 
 
90. Id. at 279–80 (Ho, J., dissenting).  The majority opinion also accepted “objective 
reasonableness” as the standard to evaluate the employer’s direct threat determination.  Id. at 270 n.5, 
274 n.9. 
91. Id. at 281–83. 
92. Id. at 282. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 283. 
99. Id. at 284. 
100. Id. at 283–84. 
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Ultimately, the panel withdrew its original opinion and issued a new 
opinion.101  In the new opinion, the panel reached the same end result with the 
majority concluding a genuine issue of material fact existed on direct threat102 
and the dissent disagreeing for the same evidentiary reasons.103  However, the 
new majority opinion withdrew its “process-based” theory of liability language 
and specifically disclaimed any reliance on that theory as support for its 
decision.104 
The disagreement between the majority and dissent in Nall through two 
rounds of opinions demonstrates the complexity in deciding how to apply the 
objective reasonableness standard in the direct threat context.  Both majority 
and dissent in Nall appear to be correct in concluding that there is no 
independent requirement under the ADA for the employer to follow a certain 
set of procedures in every case in making a “direct threat” assessment.105  But 
the pragmatic reality is that procedure should still matter in determining the 
objective reasonableness of an employer’s actions.  And following certain 
procedures should make it easier for the employer to prove its direct threat 
assessment was reasonable. 
Compliance with the following reasonable procedural protocols should 
place the employer in a better position to argue the objective reasonableness of 
 
101. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2019) (withdrawing prior opinion and 
substituting new opinion). 
102. Id. at 343–48. 
103. Id. at 352 (Ho, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“I applaud the majority for withdrawing 
its earlier opinion in this matter, for the reasons stated in footnote 6 of its revised opinion.  Although I 
would still affirm the district court for the case-specific evidentiary reasons specified in my original 
dissent (but which are not independently worthy of en banc review), the panel majority has now wisely 
obviated the need for en banc rehearing in this case, by removing the process-based theory of liability 
that animated its earlier opinion.  There is no basis for such a legal theory under the ADA, for reasons 
that need not be repeated here—but are well articulated in the petition for en banc rehearing and the 
persuasive amicus briefs filed by the Association of American Railroads, the Center for Workplace 
Compliance, and the National Federation of Independent Business.”). 
104. Id. at 344 n.6 (“The dissent from [the] original opinion, as well as the petition for rehearing 
en banc and two amicus curiae submissions in support of it, expressed concern that the panel majority 
had imposed a new requirement for assertion of the direct-threat defense, to-wit: that in addition to 
showing that the employment decision was objectively reasonable, the employer must also establish 
that the process itself that was utilized in reaching that decision, considered separately, was objectively 
reasonable.  Without commenting further on the efficacy of such an approach or on whether the panel 
majority actually adopted it, we emphasize that nothing in this substitute opinion should be understood 
as employing that reasoning.”). 
105. Id. at 347, 352.   
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their actions.  First, as previously indicated, individualized assessment and 
reasonable accommodation are required.106  Second, in many cases, the 
employer should consult with an independent medical provider to evaluate the 
employee.107  The medical provider should be qualified to review the medical 
matters in the medical area that relates to the employee’s condition.108  Third, 
the medical providers should be educated on the essential job functions of the 
position and the safety requirements for the position so that they can better 
understand how the employee’s medical condition impacts health and safety in 
the employee’s actual workplace.109  As the Nall case indicates, changes to the 
essential functions of the job during the course of an independent medical 
evaluation or field testing in the workplace may lead to a concern of improper 
manipulation of a result.110  So that type of employer action is to be avoided.  
Fourth, the medical provider’s individualized assessment of the employee 
should include steps such as examination of the employee, interview of the 
employee, review of the employee’s relevant medical records, and a report on 
the medical provider’s finding and conclusions regarding the employee’s safety 
risk.111  The medical provider will need to evaluate the employee’s condition 
and ability to safely perform the job in light of current medical knowledge in 
 
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
107. See supra note 73. 
108. See ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL 
EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES, supra note 73 (“To meet th[e direct threat] burden, an employer may 
want to have the employee examined by a health care professional of its choice who has expertise in 
the employee’s specific condition . . . . ).  See also supra note 73 and accompanying text; Anderson v. 
Consolidation Coal Co., 636 F. App’x 175, 183 (4th Cir. 2016) (finding that under West Virginia’s 
direct threat provision, reviewing doctors who had the ability to conduct medical testing and were 
experienced in providing occupational medical evaluations were qualified to give opinion on direct 
threat issue even though they were not specialists in treating the medical condition of the employee); 
Engle v. Physician Landing Zone, No.14-1192, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35996, at *3–4 (W.D. Pa. 
March 14, 2017) (psychiatrist chosen to conduct independent medical examination of employee who 
had post-traumatic stress disorder). 
109. Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. App’x 1, 15–16 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that the doctor 
had knowledge of employee’s job duties and working environment and educated other reviewing 
physicians about the employee’s working environment, and that employee’s condition was evaluated 
with regard to his specific job duties). 
110. Nall, 917 F.3d at 343–44. 
111. Michael v. Troy Police Dep’t., 808 F.3d 304, 307–08 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting the employer 
relied on opinions of medical doctors who personally examined the employee, spent extensive time 
reviewing test data, and wrote very detailed and thorough reports outlining the reasons why the 
employee was unable to safely perform job functions). 
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that field of medicine.112  Fifth, if the medical provider reaches a conclusion 
that the employee is not safe to perform the job functions, the employer should 
independently review the medical provider’s reasoning for the conclusion to 
make sure it is not inherently flawed or obviously inadequate.113  Finally, if the 
employer is presented with competing conclusions from various experts, it may 
be helpful for the evidence to demonstrate the reasons why a medical expert 
who has determined that an employee is unsafe for a specific position disagrees 
with another expert who has come to the contrary conclusion.114 
C. Objective Reasonableness and Civil Procedure  
This Article has demonstrated the following: (1) an open question exists as 
to the burden of proof in a Title I direct threat case; (2) objective reasonableness 
is the standard for evaluating an employer’s direct threat determination; and (3) 
procedural protocols—even if not required—matter in evaluating the objective 
reasonableness of an employer’s action with respect to direct threat.  The 
remainder of this Article suggests modifications to the civil procedure aspects 
of Title I direct threat law to improve the law in this area.  The focus is on 
incorporating objective reasonableness and medical evaluation procedural 
protocols into the direct threat defense and then conveying how these changes 
should impact summary judgment and jury instructions in direct threat cases.115  
Finally, the Article addresses possible objections to these modifications. 
 
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
113. Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 646 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding a doctor’s 
opinion that was only “two scribbled lines at the bottom of a boilerplate evaluation form” was 
inadequate). 
114. Engle v. Physician Landing Zone, No. 14-1192, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35996, at *22–23 
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2017) (describing employer’s doctor who determined that it was unsafe for the 
employee to work in the position and who explained the reasons why he maintained his same opinion 
even after the employee’s psychiatrist cleared the employee to return to work); see also ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE ON DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES, 
supra note 73 (“In evaluating conflicting medical information, the employer may find it helpful to 
consider: (1) the area of expertise of each medical professional who has provided information; (2) the 
kind of information each person providing documentation has about the job’s essential functions and 
the work environment in which they are performed; (3) whether a particular opinion is based on 
speculation or on current, objectively verifiable information about the risks associated with a particular 
condition; and (4) whether the medical opinion is contradicted by information known to or observed 
by the employer (e.g., information about the employee’s actual experience in the job in question or in 
previous similar jobs).”). 
115. This Article also presented the issue of whether an employer’s across-the-board safety-
based qualification standard must meet “direct threat” requirements to satisfy the “business necessity” 
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1. Direct Threat Is an Affirmative Defense  
There is clearly ambiguity in the statute concerning burden of proof on 
direct threat.  Given the ambiguity, the best approach is to evaluate the issue on 
the basis of considerations such as fairness, convenience of the parties, and the 
ease or difficulty of making proof.116  Because the employer is in a better 
position than the employee to have all the information that factored into its 
direct threat determination, it makes sense to put the burden of proof on the 
defendant-employer to prove the direct threat defense by a preponderance of 
the evidence.117  For example, the employer should have all the information 
concerning the medical evaluations of the employee, medical provider reports 
assessing the employee’s safety risk, essential job functions, and other tests or 
objective information the employer considered in making its determination.  
Therefore, direct threat should be characterized as a true affirmative defense.  
The question then becomes: What are the elements of the direct threat 
defense that the employer has to prove?  Here, I advocate for what could be 
viewed as a change in the conceptualization and articulation of this defense.  
The starting point is the definition of direct threat, which is taken directly from 
the statute and EEOC regulations.118  But, after that, the direct threat defense 
should be understood to require that the employer prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that its determination that the plaintiff-employee posed a direct 
threat to the health or safety of the individual or others was objectively 
reasonable.  As argued in this Article, that is the appropriate standard.119  The 
employer must prove objective reasonableness by proving by a preponderance 
of the evidence that (1) it conducted an individualized assessment of the 
employee’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job; (2) it 
could not eliminate the direct threat by providing the employee a reasonable 
accommodation; and (3) its direct threat determination was based on a 
reasonable medical judgment of the employee’s ability to safely perform job 
 
defense.  See supra Section III.B.  There may be a way to frame the business necessity defense in a 
way that incorporates objective reasonableness concepts as well, but that idea is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
116. Firefighters Inc. for Racial Equal. v. Bach, 611 F. Supp. 166, 171 (D. Colo. 1985) 
(“Considerations of fairness . . . require that the defendant[, in a Title VII case,] have the burden of 
proving its seniority system is bona fide.”). 
117. Id. (“Presumptions shifting the burden of proof are often created to conform with a party’s 
superior access to the proof.”). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a), (b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996). 
119. See supra Sections IV.A–B. 
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functions or on the best available objective evidence of the employee’s ability 
to safely perform the essential functions of the job.120 
Employers should generally be able to rely on reasonable medical expert 
determinations that an employee poses too much of a safety risk to allow the 
employee to work in the position even when other medical expert 
determinations differ.  Within a spectrum of reasonableness, one employer may 
evaluate the objective medical evidence and decide to be more risk-averse than 
another and to not violate the law.  To this end, the “individualized assessment” 
and “reasonable medical judgment” elements would generally be satisfied when 
the employer acted on the basis of a reasonable medical judgment from a 
qualified medical provider opining that the employee is not qualified for 
continued employment in the position in question due to the safety issues.   
The objective reasonableness of the employer’s direct threat determination, 
which may be based on the medical opinion of a qualified medical provider, 
should consider factors such as the medical provider’s examination of the 
employee, the medical provider’s review of the employee’s relevant medical 
records, and the medical provider’s evaluations of other relevant tests.121  In 
addition, the medical provider’s explanatory reasons for their safety 
determination and medical judgment would need to meet some standard of 
thoroughness and be tied to safe performance of the essential functions of the 
position.122  Finally, the employer would have to demonstrate that the medical 
provider was properly educated on the essential functions of the position and 
the actual nature of the working environment so that there would be assurance 
that the risk assessment is based on the safe performance of actual job duties.123 
2. Objective Reasonableness and Its Impact on Summary Judgment and Jury 
Instructions 
With direct threat as an affirmative defense based on objective 
reasonableness and, with employer procedures playing a role in proving 
objective reasonableness, it becomes clearer how to best evaluate direct threat 
cases at the summary judgment stage and through jury instructions, if trial is 
reached.  Because direct threat is an affirmative defense, the employer will have 
to conclusively prove each and every element of the defense to be entitled to 
 
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r). 
121. See supra Section IV.B.   
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
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summary judgment.124  But, under the objective reasonableness standard, this 
will basically boil down to the employer proving that no reasonable juror could 
view the employer’s direct threat determination of direct threat as objectively 
unreasonable.125  Under this standard, when there are competing medical 
judgments by different medical providers, the employer should often be able to 
win on summary judgment because medical experts disagreeing among 
themselves is not enough to show the employer’s objective unreasonableness 
and create a fact question to go to the jury.126  If the employer is acting in 
reliance on a medical judgment made after the procedural safeguards previously 
articulated, there would generally have to be summary judgment evidence that 
the medical judgment is still somehow unworthy of credence, discredited, and 
not to be relied on to create a fact question for the jury.127 
If a direct threat case goes to the jury, the foundation of the jury instructions 
should be the objectively reasonable standard.  That is a different approach than 
is found in many model jury instructions on direct threat.128  The model jury 
 
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying 
each . . . defense . . . on which summary judgment is sought.  The court shall grant summary judgment 
if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
125. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 912 F.3d 263, 281 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., dissenting), withdrawn, 
917 F.3d 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that for the creation of a genuine issue of material fact 
“it is not enough that experts disagree over the whether or not the [employee] presents a direct threat 
to the health . . . of others.  Rather, there must be evidence that it was objectively unreasonable for [the 
employer] to reach that conclusion.”). 
126. Price v. WG Yates & Sons Constr. Co., No. 4:15cv419-MW/CAS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
219449, at *3–5, *5 n.2 (N.D. Fla. March 27, 2017) (finding no genuine issue of material fact where 
employee’s physician and defendant’s medical experts disagreed on whether employee posed a direct 
threat to the health and safety of others; treating physician’s testimony does not create a “battle of the 
experts” to be decided by a jury). 
127. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 347 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[A]lthough there is no 
requirement under the ADA for the employer to follow certain procedures in making a ‘direct threat’ 
assessment, the language in Echazabal and the related EEOC regulation establishes that intentional 
disregard for the best available objective evidence, in whatever form it takes, undermines an 
employer’s credibility and renders [the] direct threat conclusion objectively unreasonable.” (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002))); Michael v. Troy Police Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 
316 (6th Cir. 2015) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (“Drawing the line between a reasonable 
versus an unreasonable medical opinion might at times prove difficult, but . . . at the very least, a 
medical opinion ceases to be objectively reasonable when the ‘record is replete with factual evidence 
available to the [employer] at the time that flatly contradicts [a doctor’s] unsubstantiated conclusion.”). 
128. NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 12.11 (2019) (“It is a defense to 
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instructions on the direct threat defense in the circuit courts and from the ABA 
appear to present the defense to the jury as a de novo jury review of whether a 
direct threat actually existed, according to its view of the evidence.129  These 
model instructions do not use the objective reasonableness term, nor do they 
seemingly present the concept of objective reasonableness at all.130  The model 
instructions actually encourage the opposite of an objective reasonableness 
standard.  They permit the jury to find in the plaintiff’s favor if there is some 
evidence from a medical professional that the employee could safely perform 
job duties and was not a direct threat.131  With the changed approach, the mere 
inclusion of the objective reasonableness concept in some form or fashion 
would properly reset the jury’s focus away from whether the employer made a 
“correct” direct threat determination to whether it made an objectively 
reasonable one.132  And as part of the objective reasonableness language, jury 
 
the plaintiff’s ADA claim if the plaintiff posed a direct threat to the health and safety of others . . . .  
The defendant claiming the direct threat defense must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff posed a direct threat to the health or safety of [others] . . . .”); MODEL CIVIL JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT § 9.3.1 (2019) (“Your verdict must 
be for [defendant] if [defendant] has proved both of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: 
First: [Defendant] [specify actions taken with respect to plaintiff] because [plaintiff] posed a direct 
threat to the health or safety of [plaintiff] [others in the workplace] . . . .”); EMP’T & LABOR 
RELATIONS LAW COMM., LITIG. SECTION, AM. BAR ASS’N, MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: 
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 66 (Jon W. Green & Susan Potter Norton eds., 2005) (emphasis added) 
[hereinafter MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION] (“It is [the] defendant’s burden 
of proof that the plaintiff posed a direct threat. . . . Your determination must be based on your specific 
assessment of [the plaintiff’s] ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job.”). 
129. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, supra note 128, at 66. 
130. MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE 
EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 9.61 (2018); COMM. ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 4.10 (2017); COMM. ON 
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES ASS’N: FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 11.12(C) (2016). 
131. In a direct threat case, there is sometimes evidence in the record that the employee’s treating 
physician concluded that plaintiff could safely perform job duties.  Such evidence by itself would 
typically not be enough to overcome the employer’s direct threat defense if the employer is relying on 
a reasonable medical judgment from a qualified medical provider stating that the employee poses too 
much of a safety risk to work in the job in question.  See Coleman v. Pa. State Police, 561 F. App’x 
138, 145 n.13 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]here is no law to bar [the employer] from trusting its own physician’s 
assessment of risk over that provided by [the employee’s] treating physician.”). 
132. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 912 F.3d 263, 281 (5th Cir. 2018) (Ho, J., dissenting), withdrawn by 
917 F.3d 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2019) (“In a faithful application of the ‘objectively reasonable’ standard, 
the question for juries is not whether an employer was ‘right’ to find a direct threat to safety, but 
whether it was reasonable to do so. . . .  The distinction between what is ‘right’ and what is simply 
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instructions should properly bring in language regarding employer 
consideration of the opinions of qualified medical experts.  The following are 
suggested jury instructions and a jury question on the direct threat defense. 
a. Direct Threat Jury Instructions and Jury Question 
In this case, the defendant-employer has asserted that its 
decision to discharge the plaintiff-employee was based upon 
its determination that the plaintiff-employee posed a direct 
threat to the health and safety of himself or others in the 
workplace.  A direct threat means a significant risk of 
substantial harm to the health or safety of the plaintiff-
employee or others in the workplace.  In determining whether 
an individual would pose a direct threat, factors to be 
considered include: (1) the duration of the risk, (2) the nature 
and severity of the potential harm; (3) the likelihood that the 
potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the 
potential harm. 
The direct threat defense requires the defendant-employer 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that its 
determination that the plaintiff-employee posed a direct threat 
was objectively reasonable.  As the fact finder, you must not 
independently assess whether you believe the plaintiff-
employee posed a direct threat.  Nor must you accept the 
defendant-employer’s defense merely because the defendant-
employer alleges it acted in good faith in concluding a direct 
threat existed.  The defendant-employer must prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that its direct threat 
determination was objectively reasonable; however, the 
defendant-employer need not prove that its determination was 
correct. 
Objective reasonableness requires the defendant-employer 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) it 
conducted an individualized assessment of the plaintiff-
employee’s ability to safely perform the essential functions of 
the job; (2) no reasonable accommodation exists that would 
have eliminated any possible direct threat; and (3) its direct 
threat determination was based on a reasonable medical 
judgment that the plaintiff-employee could not safely perform 
 
‘reasonable’ is critical, because the ADA does not forbid reasonable reliance on allegedly incorrect 
experts, but rather, irrational discrimination against the disabled.”). 
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the essential functions of the job or on the best available 
objective evidence that the plaintiff-employee could not safely 
perform the essential functions of the job.  A reasonable 
medical judgment is one that is based on the most current 
medical knowledge. 
In considering whether the defendant-employer’s direct 
threat determination was objectively reasonable, you should 
consider the defendant-employer’s reliance on the opinion of 
one or more qualified medical experts who have conducted an 
individualized evaluation of the plaintiff-employee’s medical 
condition and assessed the safety risks of the plaintiff-
employee performing essential job functions.  A defendant-
employer’s determination that a person cannot safely perform 
his job functions is objectively reasonable when the defendant-
employer relies upon one or more medical opinions that are 
objectively reasonable.  One medical opinion may conflict with 
other medical opinions and still be objectively reasonable.  
However, a medical opinion would not be objectively 
reasonable when there is convincing evidence that discredits 
the opinion, and a reasonable defendant-employer should 
understand that such evidence renders the opinion invalid or 
unreliable.133 
There is not much case law on jury instructions in direct threat cases.  But 
there is indication that some courts would agree with framing jury instructions 
in a way similar to the one I propose.  The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits 
have the most case law focusing on objective reasonableness as the direct threat 
standard.134  In the Tenth Circuit, a jury verdict against an employer in a direct 
threat case was reversed because the jury instructions did not include and 
explain the objective reasonableness concept.135  It is not far-fetched to believe 
that other circuits might properly require some type of objective reasonableness 
 
133. The jury question would ask: Did the defendant-employer prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that its direct threat determination was objectively reasonable? 
134. See Coleman, 561 F. App’x at 144–45; Nall, 917 F.3d at 342–43; Michael v. Troy Police 
Dep’t, 808 F.3d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2015); Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113, 1121–23 (10th Cir. 2007). 
135. EEOC v. Beverage Distrib. Co., L.L.C., 780 F.3d 1018, 1021–22 (10th Cir. 2015) 
(determining that “direct threat” jury instruction stating that the employer had to prove that the 
employee posed a direct threat was erroneous because under Tenth Circuit case law the employer only 
had to prove that it reasonably believed the employee working in the job would cause a direct threat; a 
separate part of the instruction did not cure the error by directing the jury, without explanation, to 
consider the reasonableness of the employers’ belief). 
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instruction in a direct threat case.  That change would significantly improve 
“direct threat” law. 
3. Objections and Responses 
There are a variety of possible objections to the approach advocated.  First, 
some might quibble with the burden of proof issue and my advocacy for direct 
threat as an affirmative defense.  There certainly is a good argument that the 
employee should have to prove the ability to safely perform essential job 
functions to be a qualified individual.136  But even if the burden of proof is 
flipped to the employee in a direct threat case to address the safety issue, it 
would still seem that objective reasonableness is the standard and cases should 
be evaluated on that basis.  Indeed, in some direct threat cases the courts are 
saying they will not resolve the burden of proof issue but are just deciding the 
case the same way regardless of who has the burden of proof.137  The issue 
seems to be more about whether to conceptualize the standard as objective 
reasonableness.  If so, then the issue becomes how to apply that standard in the 
context of a set of facts where the employer is provided with conflicting 
evidence about the employee’s safety risk, without burden of proof issues 
driving the resolution of the case.138  
Second, an objection could be made to bringing in the procedural steps the 
employer goes through to make a direct threat determination as part of the 
 
136. See supra Section III.A. 
137. Nall, 917 F.3d at 343 n.5 (emphasis omitted) (“We do not reach the question of which party 
bears the burden of proof regarding the direct threat defense. . . .  Even assuming arguendo that the 
burden is [on the employee], at this stage, he has satisfied it.”); Wurzel v. Whirlpool Corp., 482 F. 
App’x 1, 12 n.14 (6th Cir. 2012) (raising the issue but noting that Sixth Circuit has not decided the 
issue and declining to resolve the issue because it was unnecessary to resolve the case); Sista v. CDC 
Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 170 n.3 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Although the parties disagree as to which 
party bears the burden of proving or disproving that an employee poses a direct threat . . . , we need 
not address this issue, given our resolution of this case.”); Rose v. Laskey, 110 F. App’x 136, 138 (1st  
Cir. 2004) (finding an employee who made workplace violence threats was not qualified for 
employment regardless of whether the employer had the burden to prove he posed no threat to safety 
in order to show he was otherwise qualified or whether the defendant is viewed as having the burden 
of proving “direct threat” as an affirmative defense). 
138. Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 912 F.3d 263, 270 n.5 (5th Cir. 2018), withdrawn, 917 F.3d 335, 338 
(5th Cir. 2019) (“We note that the dissenting opinion acknowledges that we have stated the law 
correctly [objectively reasonable standard].  Our disagreement with that opinion stems from the proper 
application of the law in this case—specifically, how to evaluate the objective reasonableness of [the 
employer’s] actions.”). 
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overall objective reasonable analysis.  Indeed, in Nall, the judges on the panel 
seemed to ultimately agree that there was no independent process-based theory 
of liability in an ADA direct threat case.139  The response is that pragmatically 
looking at employer protocols in helping to prove objective reasonableness is 
not the same as imposing liability on the employer for not following a specified 
set of procedures applicable in every case.  If courts look carefully at how 
employers are taking certain steps to help them make direct threat 
determinations, it can only help courts make better decisions on the objective 
reasonableness of the employer’s actions. 
Third, an objection could be made that the advocated approach is a road 
map for employers to avoid liability under the defense.  Simply put, just find 
one medical provider who will opine that the employee cannot safely perform 
job duties and the employer automatically escapes ADA liability and proves the 
direct threat defense.140  That is not my position. 
My approach is consistent with the purposes of the ADA.  Under the Arline 
rationale and the ADA’s legislative history, a key point of the ADA is to make 
sure that employers are not acting against disabled employees on the basis of 
myth, stereotype, or the lack of objective evidence.141  The objective 
reasonableness approach—with some level of deference to employer decision-
making based on a medical provider’s assessment of the employee posing a 
direct threat—requires thorough individualized assessment, verified attempts at 
reasonable accommodation, and employer action on the basis of reasonable 
medical judgments.  It does not permit employer actions on the basis of 
 
139. Nall, 917 F.3d at 344 n.6, 352. 
140. Nall, 912 F.3d 263, 273 n.7 (5th Cir. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (“If the proper inquiry is 
into the reasonableness of the employer’s conclusion about the employee’s fitness to work, the 
employer will win at the summary judgment stage as long as one doctor agrees with the employer’s 
decision.  Our approach, in contrast, does not distill summary judgment in these cases into a syllogism 
under which plugging in the proper premises produces a certain result regardless of the facts.  Simply 
put, facts matter, and we reserve material fact issues for juries.”); Michael v. Troy Police Dep’t, 808 
F.3d 304, 315 (6th Cir. 2015) (Gilman, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven if the majority’s broad proposition that 
employers can never be penalized for choosing to credit one objectively reasonable medical opinion 
over another objectively reasonable medical opinion is correct, there must come a point where a 
medical opinion ceases to be objectively reasonable.  A contrary rule would allow an employer to avoid 
liability for an adverse employment action simply by seeking the opinion of a doctor known to 
consistently favor the employer.  This expedient would strip employees of the protections that the ADA 
was intended to provide, and it accordingly cannot be the law.”). 
141. See supra Parts I & II. 
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irrational discrimination against a disabled individual that is focused on myth, 
stereotype, or unfounded evidence. 
The advocated approach simply recognizes that it is appropriate to give 
employers some amount of space to choose to err on the side of workplace 
safety when a qualified medical provider has opined that there is too much risk 
involved in allowing an employee to perform the job and that a sufficient 
explanation exists for the opinion.  Within a proper spectrum, some reasonable 
employers may choose to be more risk-averse than other reasonable employers, 
and the law should permit erring on the side of greater safety.  This approach 
permits consideration and analysis of arguments that the employer actions were 
a sham to find a biased medical provider to manufacture an improper opinion 
on safety, the medical provider’s medical judgment is unreliable because of 
lack of knowledge of the essential job duties or workplace environment,142 or 
that the medical provider’s opinions were so unsubstantiated that they could not 
be believed and relied upon by a reasonable employer.143  The outcome would 
generally be, however, that when reasonable medical providers follow proper 
procedural protocols and then reach different medically reasonable conclusions 
as to whether a particular employee can safely perform job functions, the 
employer can choose as a matter of law the path that is more risk-averse.144  
Without this perspective, the law will push the employer to run risks that the 
law was designed to prevent.145  This approach would change the results of a 
number of direct threat cases where courts are seemingly not applying an 
objectively reasonable standard and are then finding that genuine issues of 
material fact exist simply because there are conflicting reasonable medical 
 
142. Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1090–92 (10th Cir. 2008) (denying 
summary judgment because doubts about whether employer provided a reviewing medical professional 
with full information about the essential job functions of the electrician position factored into direct 
threat analysis, creating a material issue of fact). 
143. Keith v. Cty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 924 (6th  Cir. 2013) (finding employer’s doctor 
failed to make adequate inquiry when the doctor immediately dismissed the employee’s ability to 
perform the job without any analysis at all); Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637, 646 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (finding the doctor’s opinion, which was only “two scribbled lines at the bottom of a 
boilerplate evaluation form,” was inadequate). 
144. Michael, 808 F.3d at 309 (“Reasonable doctors of course can disagree . . . as to whether a 
particular employee can safely perform the functions of his job.  That is why the law requires only that 
the employer rely on an ‘objectively reasonable’ opinion, rather than an opinion that is correct.”). 
145. Id. (“[I]n many cases, the question whether one doctor is right that an employee can safely 
perform his job functions, or another doctor is right that the employee cannot, will be unknowable—
unless the employer runs the very risk that the law seeks to prevent.”). 
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determinations from different qualified medical providers about the safety 
risks, and there is some evidence to support a finding that the employee was not 
a direct threat.146   
Finally, an objection could be made that de novo review by juries of 
whether the employer made the “correct” direct threat decision is the proper 
standard.  Under this argument, the Bragdon standard does not apply to 
disability discrimination in employment cases under Title I of the ADA, and 
the law takes a different route than “objective reasonableness.”  For the reasons 
articulated throughout this Article, that standard would not be a good 
approach.147  But if that view somehow carries the day, it would require a 
reshaping of employer decision-making when evaluating safety risks posed by 
employees.  Perhaps the law would need to establish a more formalized system 
where medical provider disagreements on direct threat can be resolved more 
authoritatively and definitively such that employers can have assurances that 
they will be protected by law when making safety decisions.148  Absent such a 
change, it would be more difficult to accomplish the purposes of the direct 
threat defense. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The direct threat defense should be applicable in limited circumstances.  
The stakes are high.  The law does not want to improperly screen out disabled 
individuals from employment opportunities based on irrational fear, myth, 
stereotype, or unfounded evidence.  If disabled employees lose job 
opportunities because of safety issues, they may face challenges finding other 
types of work and social services to sustain their livelihood.  This practical issue 
should always be a focus.  But the law should also provide the employer with 
 
146. Umanzor v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, No. 14-CV-9850 (VSB), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22707, 
at *10–23 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018); Pollard v. Drummond Co., No. 2:12-CV-03948-MHH, 2015 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 120279, at *18–23 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 2015); Nelson v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 
2732 (JPO), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117742, at *28–43 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2013). 
147. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
148. See Anderson v. Consolidation Coal Co., 636 F. App’x 175, 178–84 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting 
with approval the outcome of a collective bargaining agreement process where conflicting medical 
evidence about the employee’s safety led to consideration of the direct threat issue by a three-doctor 
panel with resolution by the majority’s decision); Hart v. City of Johnstown, No. 6:16-CV-619 
(NAM/TWD), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52011, *2–20 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2019) (granting summary 
judgment for employer that reinstated a police officer it had previously determined posed a direct threat 
only after a formal hearing—pursuant to a New York leave procedure law applicable to police 
officers—resolved a disagreement among doctors and made a determination that the employee was 
qualified to safely perform the job). 
GONZALEZ_24JAN20 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/24/2020  4:52 PM 
546  MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:513 
 
 
the freedom to act reasonably to protect the health and safety of the individual 
and other employees in the workplace.  The direct threat provision under Title 
I of the ADA should be an affirmative defense, an objective reasonableness 
standard should apply to the defense, evaluation of the proof of the defense 
should take into consideration the procedural steps the employer uses in making 
its direct threat determination, and an employer’s direct threat determination 
may be objectively reasonable if based on a reasonable medical opinion from a 
qualified medical provider that the employee poses a direct threat even if 
another reasonable medical professional disagrees. 
 
